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AUTOMATIC OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW: HOW A FEDERAL AGENCY CAN VIOLATE
CONGRESSIONAL WILL AND GET AWAY WITH IT
INTRODUCTION
Automobile accidents are a major health problem in this coun-
try, accounting for thousands of deaths and crippling disabilities each
year.' Scientific research on automobile safety2 has produced a number
of passenger restraint technologies3 which would drastically reduce
1. Crash injuries are the leading cause of premature death among persons
age one to twenty-four, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD., MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
ANN. REP. 36 app. (1979), and a major cause of epilepsy, paraplegia, and cerebral palsy,
Hearings on Passive Restraint Rule Before Senate Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion Committee, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1977) (Statements of Epilepsy Foundation
of America).
2. Research has shown that the majority of injuries automobile occupants
suffer in car accidents are a result of collision of the occupants with the car's dashboard,
windshield or other parts of the interior rather than from the collision of the car with
opposing objects. 15 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969). See generally A. LITTLE, THE STATE OF
THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY 211 (1970) (reducing injury by limiting occupancy movement
to prevent or reduce contact with the interior surfaces); A. WHITE, PASSENGER CAR
SAFETY DYNAMICS 387 (1965) (the severity of injury in automobile accidents is rarely in
direct relation to crash forces because most injuries result from passengers being thrown
against objects inside the compartment). See also INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY
CONFERENCE, 1970 INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY CONFERENCE COMPENDIUM (1970)
(hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM).
While the human body can easily withstand the force of the external collision,
it often cannot tolerate the sharp blow delivered in this "second collision."
[T]he objects and surfaces struck by the [human] body do less damage
if the forces involved are spread over time and area. This is elementary
physics. A fall on a surface that 'gives,' such as a pile of hay, spreads
the force over time. Poking someone with the end of a baseball bat instead
of an ice pick spreads the force over area .... Damage is done not by
the force, but by the distortions produced as a consequence of this force.
R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 83 (1965) (quotes omitted).
3. Scientists have devised a number of ways to soften the impact of the
"second collision" by devices that "package" people for transport. See R. NADER. supra
note 2, at 112-13 (the cardinal principle of occupant restraint is "packaging" the
passenger so that he is firmly but comfortably anchored in order to prevent him from
being thrown against the inside of the vehicle or ejected). Scientists have designed
safety systems involving thick padding of all interior surfaces, harness belts which
duplicate medical traction hardware, and alternative passenger compartment designs
that anchor passengers by limiting space. COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 978-1112.
The most promising technologies in existence today include seat belt systems,
either manual or automatic, and airbags. Airbags are inflatable balloon-like containers
that fill with gas when a crash occurs. These bags fill the passenger compartment
space and absorb the forces of the "second collision" by spreading them over a huge
area. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,626 (1983).
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injury and fatality.' However, for a number of reasons,' passenger
restraint technologies are not currently being used to their fullest
safety potential.'
In response to this problem, the federal government has recently
attempted to improve automobile safety by requiring automakers to
equip all new cars with automatic7 occupant restraint systems. The
4. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,425 (1981).
5. Federal legislators have documented this point:
Despite the various changes to seat belt designs to improve the conve-
nience of seat belt usage (replacing separate lap and shoulder belts and
buckles with an integrated lap and shoulder belt giving a single buckle
and adding an inertia reel to give occupants freedom of movement) and
to remind occupants to use their belts (adding brief audible and visual
reminders), the rate of manual belt use has not change substantially over
the 15-year history of [federal law mandate].
48 Fed. Reg. 48,626 (1983). People don't use seat belts for a number of reasons including
ignorance and skepticism of their safety effectiveness, indifference, fatalism and doubts
that driving is hazardous. People complain that belts are inconvenient and uncomfor-
table, and claim that they do not wear them because of laziness, fear of entrapment,
and forgetfulness. Why Hardly Anybody Buckles Up, 36 CHANGING TIMES 82 (October
1982); See also The Rise and Fall of Ralph Nader, 28 CAR & DRIVER 64, 67 (September
1982) (so few people use seat belts because they consider automobiles so safe that
they don't feel endangered).
6. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,964 (1984). Only twelve percent (12%) of the public cur-
rently uses manual seat belts, which is the only technology generally available on
the market. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,626 (1983).
7. "Automatic" technologies are, for the purpose of this note, safety systems
that require no affirmative action by passengers in order to be effective. Currently,
airbags and automatic belt systems are the only automatic technologies in existence.
In the past, these systems have been called "passive restraints," but for the sake
of clarity, they will be referred to in this note as automatic restraints.
Airbag technology was first proposed in 1966 and only perfected in 1970. CoM-
PENDIUM, supra note 2, at 985. The federal government recognized the possibility of "in-
flatable occupant restraint systems" in 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969), and first allowed
for their use in 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970). The bag will inflate upon an impact
of about 10 miles an hour, at which time a sensor triggers a chemical reaction where
sodium azide changes to nitrogen, rapidly inflating the bag. After the crash, the bag
quickly deflates to permit emergency egress. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,626 (1983). These systems
will be referred to as "airbags."
Automatic belt systems are modified seat belts. Automatic belts are one piece
harnesses that wrap around passengers as they enter the car. One end of the belt
would attach between the front seats and the other to the car door; this enables the
belt to move out of the way when the door is opened and move securely around the
occupant when the door is shut. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,625 (1983). A number of different
belt designs exist. Some designs consist of a single shoulder belt with a bolster to
the occupant's knees to keep him from sliding under the belt, while others include
both a lap and shoulder belt. Some designs are completely detachable to allow for
emergency egress, and others allow for emergency egress by a spool release device
or practical detachability to create a slack in the system. Id.
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)l recently
announced a regulation mandating installation of automatic occupant
restraints in all new cars by 1990.' This controversial regulation is
the result of more than a decade of planning and political
maneuvering." The new regulation represents a compromise between
total abandonment of automatic restraints and direct implementation 1
of the most promising automatic technologies. 2
Administrative decision-making in this controversial area is
strongly affected by a matter which is just as controversial, namely,
the nature of judicial review the regulation will face. Judicial review
of most federal regulatory decision-making follows the structure set
forth by the Administrative Procedure Act." Under this act, federal
courts review regulatory process as well as substantive decisions."
While the act and the Supreme Court have provided some clear limits
on judicial review," much of the scope of review remains undefined.
Thus, the proper role of the judiciary in administrative decision-making
continues to be a point of controversy.
This note has a twofold purpose: to critique the new automatic
occupant restraint regulation and to clarify the judiciary's role in
8. For further discussion of the powers of the NHTSA, see infra text ac-
companying notes 16-21.
9. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984).
10. Automatic occupant restraint regulations are the product of more than
a decade of debate. Although a regulation now exists which would require cars to
be equipped with automatic systems by 1990, similar regulations in the past have often
been changed, suspended and even rescinded. See infra text accompanying notes 16-103.
11. Automobile manufacturers led the fight against automatic restraints, claim-
ing that consumers don't buy them when offered as an option, The Rise and Fall of
Ralph Nader, supra note 5, at 67, and that conventional manual belts are just as effec-
tive as automatic systems if properly used, Bureaucrats and (Other) Bags of Air, 34
ROAD & TRACK 88 (November 1982).
12. Insurance companies as well as consumer advocates led the fight for adop-
tion of federal regulations requiring airbags. These groups claim that the costs of
automatic systems (in initial installation, and maintenance and repair) will be well
outweighed by the thousands of injuries they will prevent and the savings of insurance
premiums (estimated at 30%), medical bills, and funeral costs. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,629
(1983). Increased safety will also result in savings to federal government under social
security, medicare, medicaid, aid to families with dependent children, disability insurance,
lost corporate and personal income taxes, and loss of military personnel. This has
prompted one Senator to propose government-backed incentives for automatic restraints.
S. 477, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S 1161 (1983).
13. 5 U.S.C. SS 551-59, 701-06 (1977).
14. See infra notes 114-93 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
scope and nature of judicial review.
15. See infra notes 194-228 and accompanying text for analysis of judicial review
of administrative decision-making.
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reviewing this federal regulatory decision. It is here proposed that
the NHTSA's new regulation compromises Congress' mandate to pro-
mote traffic safety. While the new occupant restraint regulation will
no doubt result in some modest advances in traffic safety, Congress
intended that the NHTSA impose "technology-forcing" devices on
automobile manufacturers. Considering the NHTSA could have
imposed more promising devices, such as airbags, to achieve greater
occupant safety in the future, the agency has failed in its duties. Yet,
the remedy for the NHTSA's improper decision does not lie in the
federal courts. The nature of judicial review requires that
administrative actions be upheld when they are the product of
"reasoned decision-making." While this standard will take different
forms in different situations, it is not meant to override administrative
authority where the record shows that all options were considered
and the public explanation is reasonable. Thus, regulation should with-
stand such limited judicial review.
In order to demonstrate these points, this note is separated into
five sections. The first section presents a full account of the regulatory
history of occupant restraints as a backdrop for analysis of the new
regulation. The regulation is then critiqued in the second section, and
shown to be improper under the NHTSA's statutory mission. The third
section covers the historical development of judicial review of
administrative decision-making under the Administrative Procedure
Act and the major decisions of the Supreme Court. In the fourth sec-
tion, a model for this judicial review is proposed. This model is ap-
plied to the automatic occupant restraint regulation in the final sec-
tion, in order to clarify the limited judicial function in this area.
REGULATORY HISTORY OF OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS
Congress delegated the authority to issue federal motor vehicle
safety standards to the Department of Transportation in 1966."6 Clearly
defining the purpose of this delegation in the enabling legislation,
Congress directed the department to promote motor vehicle safety. 7
The Department of Transportation must also undertake and support
necessary research in an effort to prevent traffic accidents and reduce
16. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. SS
1381-1426 (1982).
17. 15 U.S.C. S 1381 (1982). The congressional intent, as shown in the legislative
history, was to create a federal power to force the automobile industry to improve
the safety of their products. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966); see Chrysler
Corp. v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). See generally R. NADER, supra note 2, at
295-346.
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the injuries that result from them. 8 To accomplish these goals, the
Department of Transportation must consider all relevant available
motor vehicle data"9 and propose only those standards that are
reasonable, practical, and appropriate to the type of vehicle for which
they are prescribed." The Secretary of Transportation subsequently
created the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to undertake this task."
The NHTSA exercised this delegated power in promulgating
Federal Motor Vehicle Standard 208 (Standard 208) in 1967.' This
standard required that seat belts be installed in all new passenger
cars. 3 Seat belts were designed to prevent or minimize injury to
passengers caused by impact with the interior of the car. 4 This
so-called "second collision" of occupants with the car had been shown
to be the major cause of death or serious injury in traffic accidents.25
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained, the purpose was
"to assure that when the car stops dead, the passengers won't."' Since
1967, Standard 208 has required that all new passenger cars be
equipped with seat beltsY
Dissatisfied with the public unwillingness to use seat belts, the
NHTSA soon proposed amending Standard 208.28 Although the
NHTSA still believed that seat belts could drastically reduce death
and injury if properly used, the data it collected since Standard 208
went into effect showed that a low percentage of car passengers were
using the safety device." The NHTSA proposed that the automobile
industry create new types of restraint systems that would not require
any affirmative action by car occupants to be effective. Such systems
18. 15 U.S.C. S 1392(a) (1982).
19. 15 U.S.C. S 1392(f)(1) (1982).
20. 15 U.S.C. S 1392(f)(3) (1982).
21. 49 C.F.R. S 201.3a (1983).
22. 49 C.F.R. S 571.208 (1967).
23. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1967). The seat belt requirement, 49 C.F.R. S 571.2
(1967), is but one of eighteen safety requirements announced in this rule, the others
include specifications as to car lights, transmission shift lever sequence, windshield
wiping and washing systems, tires, and so on. Id. Prior to this regulation, seat belts
were only offered as standard equipment in the front seats of automobiles. S.
PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY 2 (1975).
24. See supra note 2.
25. R. NADER, supra 2, at 81.
26. Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 663.
27. See 49 C.F.R. SS 571.208 (1967).
28. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969).
29. Id.
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were termed "automatic occupant restraint systems,"' which referred
to an undefined class of occupant restraint technologies which would
provide sufficient safety while requiring no human action to be
effective."
The NHTSA acted on its proposal almost immediately. The
NHTSA amended Standard 208 to permit certain types of automatic
occupant restraint systems to replace manual seat belts in 1970.2 In
1972, the NHTSA again amended Standard 208 to persuade the public
to use safety devices." Under Standard 208 as modified, automobile
manufacturers were required to install either approved automatic
occupant restraint systems or manual seat belts coupled with ignition
interlock in all new cars built after August of 1975.1'
Automobile manufacturers immediately filed suits challenging
modified Standard 208. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the NHTSA's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. DOT.8 However, the court
held that the NHTSA's standards for automatic occupant restraint
systems involved scientifically invalid tests. The court stayed the
effective date of the law until the NHTSA could formulate valid tests
to insure the safety benefits of these safety devices.17 As a result,
Standard 208 continued to require traditional belt systems, but the
automatic restraint requirement was postponed until proper testing
methods could be developed. 8
For the next two years, the NHTSA collected data and
considered its problem. Finally, the NHTSA solved its technical
problems and proposed revised automatic occupant restraint re-
quirements in March of 1974." A month later the NHTSA modified
30. Id. The 1969 rule-making specifically mentioned inflatable systems. No
specifications for automatic systems existed at that time.
31. Id.
32. 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970).
33. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972).
34. Id. The law defined an "ignition interlock system" as a mechanical or elec-
trical component which would make the engine starting system of a passenger car
inoperable unless the safety belt system for each occupied front seat outboard posi-
tion was operated after the occupant was seated. 49 C.F.R. S 571.208 (S7.4) (1973).
The purpose of such a system was to alert the driver of an automobile when belts
were not fastened, so as to encourage usage.
35. 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 681.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Ford Motor Co. v. NHTSA, 473 F.2d 1241, 1242 (6th Cir. 1973);
38 Fed. Reg. 16,072-73 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 20,449-50 (1973).
39. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,593 (1974).
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Standard 208 to permit automatic belt systems to fulfill safety
requirements."' Standard 208 specified that automatic belt systems
must include a push button release mechanism for emergency egress
after an accident and an ignition interlock system with a continuous
buzzer to encourage use."'
As a result of this rule, the automotive industry was required
to incorporate these devices designed to promote passenger usage in
cars built in 1974 and 1975. Most automobile manufacturers chose to
comply by installing ignition interlock systems coupled with traditional
safety belts." Consumers' irritation with the inability to start their
cars without fastening the seat belts led to a legislative prohibition
of any interlock requirement in 1974.41 In response to this congres-
sional action, the NHTSA eliminated ignition interlock requirements
from Standard 208." Thus, the automotive industry could comply with
Standard 208 by automatic systems or manual seat belts.
At this point, the NHTSA began to question the benefits of
automatic restraints. Although the life saving potential of the plan
was never doubted, the high costs of the plan were." The NHTSA
again subjected Standard 208 to a comprehensive review in 1975.6
After reconsidering the matter, the NHTSA decided to suspend the
mandatory automatic occupant restraint requirement of Standard 208
through August of 1976. Standard 208 required that cars continue to
be equipped with traditional seat belts until that time.
40. 39 Fed. Reg. 16,216 (1974).
41. Id.
42. 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976). Except for a small number of GM luxury cars
equipped with airbags, automobile manufacturers chose the interlock technology. Id.
at n.3.
43. Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974, 15 U.S.C. S
1410(b)(1) (1982). Congress clearly intended that interlock technology could no longer
be considered as an option for any alternative formulated under Standard 208. See
Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, PuB. L. No. 93-492, 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 6046, 6073, 6108.
Congress also reviewed the automatic restraint requirement of Standard 208, and
subjected any plan which allowed compliance by airbag technology to a legislative
veto of both Houses of Congress by concurrent resolution. 15 U.S.C. S 1410(b)(3)(B)
(1982). In 1983, the Supreme Court declared all legislative vetoes unconstitutional.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Between 1974
and 1983, Congress never exercised this power.
44. 39 Fed. Reg. 38,380 (1974).
45. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,220 (1975).
46. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,217 (1975).
47. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (1975).
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In June of 1976, Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman
reopened the automatic restraint issue.48 On the basis of information
collected at that time, he concluded that automatic restraints were
technologically and economically feasible, and would be substantially
effective in preventing death and injury from the "second collision"
in automobile accidents. 9 Secretary Coleman concluded, however, that
due to widespread misinformation about automatic occupant restraints,
federal imposition of any such standard would lead to the same type
of public resistance that had occurred with the interlock plan.' With
this in mind, the Secretary proposed a large scale demonstration
program to introduce automatic occupant restraints to the public. 1
Coleman deferred final decision on a mandatory automatic restraint
standard indefinitely, pending results of the demonstration program.2
Coleman also renewed Standard 208 as it stood then to require either
manual seat belts or approved automatic systems.
Brock Adams, the Carter Administration's Secretary of Transpor-
tation, rejected the Coleman plan when he came into office in 1977.'
He quickly moved to do away with the demonstration program and
reimpose mandatory automatic restraints.' Although Secretary Adams
endorsed many of the findings of his predecessor," he disagreed that
public acceptability was relevant to the congressional mission of the
NHTSA.17 Thus, the logical result of the Coleman report, claimed
Adams, was reimposition of mandatory automatic occupant restraints.'
Secretary Adams ordered that the mandatory automatic occupant
restraint requirement be implemented in a three step process. Large
cars 9 would have to be equipped with automatic occupant restraints
by September of 1981, mid-size cars" by September of 1982, and all
cars by September of 1983."' In announcing the new rule, Adams stated
48. 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976).
49. DOT, THE SECRETARY'S DECISION CONCERNING MOTOR VEHICLE OCCUPANT
CRASH PROTECTION 6 (1976).
50. See supra note 43.
51. DOT, supra note 49, at 6.
52. 42 Fed. Reg. 5071 (1977).
53. Id. Secretary Coleman had written commitments by GM, Ford, Volkswagen
and Daimler-Benz to produce over 440,000 cars with airbags and 60,000 cars with
automatic belt systems to be used in the demonstration program. How Coleman Sold
Detroit on Air Bags, 1977 Bus. WEEK 26 (January 31, 1977).
54. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,935 (1977).
55. Id.
56. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289, 34,291 (1977).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. "Large cars" refers to cars whose wheelbase measures over 114 inches.
60. "Mid-size cars" refers to cars whose wheelbase measures over 100 inches.
61. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977).
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his belief that more than sixty percent (60%) of automobiles would
meet the requirement by using airbag technology. 2 Adams made no
finding regarding use of detachable automatic belt systems at this
time. 3
Both automobile manufacturers and consumer groups challenged
Secretary Adams' decision in the court and in the legislature. Judge
Wright of The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld both the
imposition of automatic restraints and the gradual implementation
plan." The automobile manufacturers then sought redress in Congress,
which had retained the power to exercise its legislative veto over
any standard which included airbags as means of compliance." This
attack was unsuccessful, for not only did Congress decline to exer-
cise its veto power, but the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation affirmatively endorsed the Secretary's automatic
restraint ruling."'
With implementation of mandatory automatic occupant restraints
pending, controversy arose over Standard 208's automatic belt provi-
sion. When Secretary Adams mandated automatic occupant restraints,
the automatic belt provision of Standard 208 still required the push
button release mechanism which had been imposed in 1974 to insure
easy egress in an emergency." But, by 1978, the NHTSA feared that
such a mechanism, without the support of an ignition interlock system,
would be ineffective because it could be easily dismantled." The
NHTSA amended Standard 208 in 1978 to permit non-detachable belt
systems that allowed for emergency egress in other ways." Although
the NHTSA could have prohibited or standardized release mechanisms
to promote usage, it did not do so out of fear of adverse public
reaction."
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 830 (1979). The court disagreed with Secretary Adams on the question of
practicality. The court believed that public reaction was an important and relevant
consideration. Pacific Legal Foundation, 593 F.2d at 1345, 1346 n.52.
65. See supra note 43.
66. S. REP. No. 481, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
68. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,914 (1978). The NHTSA was put on notice of this problem
by GM in a petition for review of Standard 208. Id.
69. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,493 (1978).
70. Id. There are a number of non-detachable belt designs that allow for
emergency egress sufficient to comply with Standard 208. Alternatives proven by testing
include systems which "spoonout" extra lengths of webbing, systems attached to a
sliding anchor on the car door, and systems that allow the lap belt to be detached
from the door so that length is added to the shoulder belt.
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Implementation of mandatory automatic occupant restraints was
close at hand when the Reagan Administration came into office in
1981. In February of 1981, Reagan appointed Drew Lewis as Secretary
of Transportation.7 1 One of Lewis' first official actions was to announce
reconsideration of the mandatory automatic occupant restraint plan
and to postpone its implementation on large cars." Shortly thereafter,
Lewis proposed amending the implementation plan and possibly
rescinding the entire automatic occupant restraint requirement." At
this time, the NHTSA discovered that most automobile manufacturers
planned to comply with the automatic requirement by using a
completely detachable belt system." Predicting minimal increase in
use of safety equipment, the NHTSA rescinded the mandatory
automatic occupant restraint requirements, claiming that the benefits
of automatic occupant restraints no longer outweighed their costs.",
Several insurance companies immediately filed suit in federal
court challenging the rescission of the mandatory automatic restraint
requirement. 6 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
the rescission of the safety requirement was arbitrary and capricious.7
The NHTSA had failed to consider obvious alternatives such as
prohibition of detachable belts or compliance by airbag technology
only. 8 The court called the decision to abandon automatic occupant
71. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,628 (1983).
72. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033 (1981). This action brought to a halt two years of
research and retooling just months before automatic restraints were to be mandatory
in large cars.
73. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205 (1981).
74. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
75. Id. The NHTSA predicted that, because of these events, the imposition
of Standard 208 at this time would only cause a 5% increase in safety benefits, which
was not enough to outweigh the cost of the program. The NHTSA supported their
action by reference to the congressional directive that their regulations be practical
and meet the needs of safety, 15 U.S.C. S 1392(f)(3) (1982), and the presidential direc-
tive that "regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society," Exec. Order No.
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 33 (1981), at S 2(b) [hereinafter cited as E.O. 12,291].
It is unclear whether the NHTSA addressed the many alternatives to rescission
in its notice of October 29th. An argument could be made that the NHTSA justified
foregoing the alternatives of requiring airbags only or airbags or non-detachable belts
by focusing on adverse public reaction to both alternatives. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981);
cf. Pacific Legal Foundation, 593 F.2d at 1346 n.52 (public acceptance is an important
consideration when the NHTSA is judging practicality).
76. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. DOT, 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1982), aff'd, 103 U.S. 2856 (1983).
77. Id. at 240.
78. Id.
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restraints a paradigm of arbitrary and capricious action. 9 The NHTSA
had drawn conclusions not supportable by evidence in the record and
then had artifically narrowed the range of alternatives available under
its legislative mandate.' A separate concurrence called the decision
to rescind "nothing more than a determined effort to achieve a partic-
ular result without regard to the facts at hand."8 The court ordered
the automatic requirement to become effective within a year, pend-
ing action by the NHTSA to present valid reasons to the contrary.2 '
Unfortunately, the matter was not to end here.
The NHTSA appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the rescission was arbitrary
and capricious in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.3 Justice White
described the agency's error made as failure to "cogently explain why
it has exercised its discretion in a given manner."" Justice White rul-
ed that rescissions are arbitrary and capricious when an agency fails
to offer any reasoned explanation for foregoing technological alter-
natives "within the ambit of the existing standard." 5 In this case,
the Court pointed to alternatives such as requiring compliance by air-
bags only, or prohibiting compliance by detachable belt systems as
within the ambit of the existing standard, and found that such alter-
natives were inadequately considered or explained by the NHTSA."
The Court split five to four on the decision that the NHTSA
had acted arbitrarily in deciding to prohibit detachable automatic
belts. 7 The majority held that the NHTSA had failed to consider the
aspect of inertia inherent in automatic systems,88 which would work
in favor of usage." The dissent, written by Justice Rehnquist, claimed
that this decision was adequately explained in the notice of the final
rule." Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case to Court of Ap-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 242.
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id.
83. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
84. Id. at 2869.
85. Id. at 2871.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2874 (Rehnquist, J., and Powell, J., and O'Connor, J., and Burger,
C.J., dissenting in part).
88. The Court reasoned that because the detachable belts remained effective
until detached, usage would increase among people who would forget to buckle manual
belts. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2872.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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peals, with directions to remand the matter to the NHTSA for further
consideration consistent with the Court's opinion.9 1
The NHTSA responded to the Supreme Court's ruling by
suspending the automatic restraint requirement for one year in order
to consider the issues raised by the Court. 2 Under Motor Vehicle, the
NHTSA had a number of alternatives. The NHTSA could have re-
tained the automatic occupant restraint requirement as it stood,
rescinded the automatic occupant restraint requirement, or amended
the automatic occupant restraint requirement to limit compliance
alternatives."
On July 17, 1984, the NHTSA issued a new occupant restraint
regulation which substantially amends Standard 208.9' On the basis
of extensive analysis and public comment," the NHTSA decided to
impose a performance-based standard9 requiring automatic
technologies," and further provided that the whole automatic require-
ment would be rescinded if two-thirds (2/3) of the population of the
United States became subject to mandatory seat belt use laws (MUL)."
The agency's final rule is premised on three conclusions of fact: that
effectively enforced MUL's are the favored alternative, that automatic
systems are favored over manual systems if MUL's are not imposed,
and that airbags offer the greatest potential safety technology if
91. Id. at 2874.
92. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,908 (1983). In Motor Vehicle, the Court noted that such
a suspension would be necessary and allowed the NHTSA to suspend the automatic
restraint requirement without prior public notice or comment. The NHTSA published
notice of proposed rule-making on October 19, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,622 (1983).
93. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,632 (1983). The NHTSA further requested information on
new compliance alternatives, public acceptance, cost, and the state of technology. Due
to the one year deadline which was accepted by the Supreme Court, the NHTSA
attempted to expedite these proceedings by closing the docket in December of 1983
and setting a deadline of April 12, 1984 for further action.
94. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. S 571.208).
95. 49 Fed. Reg. 29,965-83 (1984). Commentators included automobile manufac-
turers, insurance companies, consumer advocates, economists, scientific researchers,
and the general public. Comments covered many aspects of proposed alternatives
including usage, effectiveness, benefits, public acceptance, costs, effects on insurance
premiums, and testing procedures. The proposed alternatives included retention of
the standard as it existed prior to the attempted rescission, limiting compliance alter-
natives, mandatory seat belt usage laws, and total rescission as was attempted in Motor
Vehicle. Id.
96. 49 Fed. Reg. 29,009 (1984) (the final rule allows compliance by any systems
that pass testing criteria, vesting automakers with the option to choose).
97. At the present time, only airbags and automatic belt systems would fulfill
the requirements of Standard 208. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,096 (1984).
98. Id. at 28,997.
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development continues." In the event that the MUL's requirement
is not met, automakers can comply with Standard 208 by installation
of airbags, passive interiors," detachable belts, or nondetachable belts,
so long as crash test standards are met.'' In addition, incentives are
built into the phase-in"12 process to promote the development of air-
bag technologies."' Thus, the NHTSA's new regulation imposes a com-
promise between rescission of all automatic requirements and
implementation of the most promising technologies.
THE IMPROPRIETY OF THE NEW OCCUPANT RESTRAINT REGULATION
The NHTSA's new occupant restraint regulation, which reim-
poses the standard the agency sought to rescind in 1981 with further
provision for total rescission on enactments of MUL's,'" adopts a
political compromise which is improper under the law. Congress
created the NHTSA to promote traffic safety by imposing technology-
forcing safety standards on an unwilling automobile industry. When
the NHTSA failed to require installation of safety technologies which
would clearly provide greater potential benefits, such as airbags or
nondetachable belt systems, the agency was disloyal to its mission.
Thus, the lenient compromise regulation is improper.
Congress clearly intended that the NHTSA implement
technology-forcing regulation. Congress' stated purpose in delegating
regulatory authority was "to promote motor vehicle safety."'1
Although Congress directed the agency to produce standards that
were "reasonable, practical and appropriate,""' the Chrysler decision
makes it clear that the agency need not be limited to technologies
in existence. ' 7 In fact, the regulatory history of seat belts makes it
99. Id. at 28,962.
100. "Passive interiors" is a new term coined by the NHTSA to refer to
automatic systems that do not rely on belts or airbags. Id. at 28,963.
101. Id. at 24,009.
102. The automatic requirements will be phased-in over a three year period
beginning in 1986. By September 1, 1986, ten percent of all new cars would have to
be equipped with automatic systems. The requirement increased to twenty-five percent
by September 1, 1987, forty percent by September 1, 1988, and one hundred percent
by September 1, 1989. Id. at 28,963.
103. The NHTSA refused to require airbags as the sole means of compliance,
despite certain and dramatic safety benefits. The NHTSA cited problems with cost,
technical bugs, adverse public reaction, and lack of performance standards as the basis
for foregoing this alternative. Id. at 29,001.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
105. 105 U.S.C. S 1381 (1982).
106. 15 U.S.C. S 1392(f)(3) (1982).
107. Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 659.
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clear that federal regulation was legislated in the first place to
stimulate research and development that the automobile industry was
unwilling to undertake on its own.0 The fact that automatic restraints
were first envisioned in the sixties and developed in the seventies,"9
but are still not in use, supports the claim that more stringent federal
law is required.
The NHTSA could have more effectively promoted safety by
imposing a standard requiring, without exception, installation of air-
bags or nondetachable belts in all new cars. While the NHTSA con-
sidered this alternative in the most recent rule-making process, the
alternative was rejected due to claimed high costs, potentially adverse
public reaction, and technical problems."' The issues of cost and public
reaction are highly speculative, and the agency cannot claim that its
findings are sufficient on these points alone to support rejection. Issues
of technical problems with design, effectiveness, and testing standards
would be best solved under the pressure of an impending federal
requirement, and must be addressed in any case where compliance
using these technologies is allowed. Because these technologies are
cited by the NHTSA as the most promising in that they will ultimately
produce the greatest safety benefits due to user ease,"' federal regula-
tion mandating their use should have occurred.
The new occupant restraint regulation is improper because it not
only fails to impose technology-forcing standards, it also undercuts
the basic idea of automatic restraints. In the first place, the standard
allows compliance by wholly detachable systems. The NHTSA has
faulted these systems in the past because they are relatively easy
to dismantle, and therefore their increased usage may be minimal. 2
On the basis of figures collected by the NHTSA in 1981, most
automobile manufacturers can be expected to offer detachable belt
systems exclusively, resulting in minimal safety gains." Secondly, by
providing for rescission of the entire automatic restraint regulation
if mandatory seat belt usage laws are enacted, the NHTSA further
defers development of the most promising systems. The new regula-
tion will likely result in increased lobbying efforts by the automobile
industry in highly populous states, and perhaps implementation of
108. R. NADER, supra note 2, at 81.
109. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
110. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,000 (1984).
111. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,991 (1984).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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safety devices that provide minimal benefits. Although the new rule
claims to support development of the most promising technologies,
it will actually result in deferring their development.
Thus, the NHTSA's new regulation is improper. Congress
intended the agency to impose the most promising safety standards
on an unwilling automobile industry. The new regulation not only fails
to do this, it undercuts development. Yet, even though the agency
doesn't fulfill the spirit of the law, the action may not be overturned
by the intra-system check of judicial review.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULMAKING: THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF
"REASONED DECISION-MAKING
1
1
14
Commentators continuously argue over the nature of judicial
review of administrative decision-making.'15 Although Congress long
ago announced the framework for such review in the Administrative
Procedure Act,1 ' the actual job of review as well as the degree of
114. This phrase will be used as a term of art to describe the judicial
requirements for review of administrative decision-making. See Qaltimore Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.
116. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the scope of
review:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case sub-
ject to (formal procedure]; or
(F) unwarranted by facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
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scrutiny to be used has been a matter of dispute for a number of
years. Many commentators continue to disagree over the nature of
judicial review.
Some commentators argue that administrative agencies should
have great freedom to use rule-making to shape their policies and
programs."7 They claim that judicial attempts to judge the correct-
ness of an administrative decision are wrongful invasions into the
sphere of power that Congress has delegated to agencies."' Although
courts should not allow administrators as much freedom to legislate
as traditional legislators,"' these commentators claim that agency
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and
due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. 5 706 (1982).
117. "The agencies' great familiarity with issues repeatedly faced, and the
institutional resources at their call, are entitled to great deference from a court which
makes only a limited and largely accidental excursion into the field." Gardner, Infor-
mal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979). See
also Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 459
(1979) (judicial review is very limited, judiciary should not act to coordinate policy
or reform the regulatory process); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1832 (1978)
(the insensitivity of reviewing courts to the agency's need to allocate its scarce resources
in the way it deems best); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975) (limited judicial role of "containment"); Wright, Court
of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rule-Making, 26 AD. L. REV. 199, 200
(1974) (judicial role is merely to insure that agency is not "shooting in the dark").
118. One court has stated:
At least in the absence of substantial justification for doing otherwise,
a reviewing court may not, after determining that additional evidence
is requisite for adequate review, proceed by dictating to the agency the
methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and order-
ing the results to be reported to the court without opportunity for further
consideration on the basis of the new evidence of the agency. Such a pro-
cedure clearly runs the risk of 'propel[ling] the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.'
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
119. Even some of the earliest cases, which allowed a very narrow review,
recognized that the judiciary had a duty to limit agencies to their legislative missions.
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182 (1935) (so long as an agency
acts within its constitutional and legislative bounds its rules will only be subjected
to a rational basis test); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1935) (judicial function
ends when courts measure regulatory action against constitutional and legislative delega-
tion, courts should not comment on policy of the law); accord Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907). See also 5 U.S.C. S 706, supra note 116; cf. City
of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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power is effectively checked by the legislative.. and executive'21
branches, and so should be subject to minimal judicial scrutiny. Thus
the role of the reviewing court should be merely to insure that the
agency is not "shooting in the dark" with their decisions. 22
Other commentators support strict judicial oversight of
administrative decision-making. They claim that all regulation, even
the most highly technical, involve political issues.22 Choosing among
competing economic and social policies is a function which Congress
cannot abdicate, they argue, and therefore courts should give narrow
interpretation to enabling statutes and void decisions when agencies
attempt to set policy.' Although broad delegations of power give
agencies broad decision-making power, this power is not without
bounds."5 These commentators argue that judicial review should
120. Formal congressional checks on administrative decision-making include
legislation to limit powers delegated, withdrawal of powers, withholding funding,
counteracting regulations with new legislation, and periodic monitoring by congres-
sional committee. Informally, congressmen can use their notoriety to bring issues they
are interested in before the public by making speeches, getting information to the
press, or bringing pressure on the agency to disclose information. Recently, there has
been proposed legislation, referred to as "sunset legislation," requiring periodic reevalua-
tion of all delegations by Congress to administrative agencies. Babcock, The Congres-
sional Responses to Chadha, 9 AD. L. NEWS 1 (1983).
121. Formal executive checks on administrative power include the power to
appoint top-level administrators, and the power to coordinate regulation. President
Reagan has expanded this power to require that all major regulations pass a cost-
benefit analysis performed by the Office of Management and Budget. E.O. 12,291, supra
note 75 See generally Bliss, Regulatory Reform: Toward More Balanced and Flexible
Federal Agency Regulation, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 619 (1981); Davis, Regulatory Reform
and Congressional Control of Regulation, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1982); Raven-
Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive
Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 295; Rosenburg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power:
Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 193 (1981).
122. Wright, supra note 117, at 200.
123. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 121, at 285; Schwartz, Of Administrators
and Philosopher-Kings: The REPUBLIC, The LAWS, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 443, 448 (1977) (restrictionless delegation has tended to make regulatory process
a political contest).
124. "The delegation . . . is not, of course, unbounded, and it is the duty of
the reviewing court to determine whether the course followed by the Commission is
consistent with its mandate from Congress." Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 806 (1973). See also City of Chicago, 458 F.2d
at 742; Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 307 (1976); Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegations and
Judicial Review, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 208; Schwartz, supra note 123; Note, Rethinking the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REV. 257 (1982),
125. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 144 (1965).
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involve thorough scrutiny of the factual basis upon which an agency
acts. Courts should approve only those regulations which agencies
justify on a full record demonstrating that the agency measured
competing considerations as Congress intended.'
Courts faced with review of agency action usually take a middle
position. They traditionally point to the Administrative Procedure Act
as the "formula upon which opposing social and political forces have
come to rest,""1 7 and then do the best they can to review all the facts
and the options before the agency. These courts give some deference
to the administrators' judgment, 8 but undertake an independent
review of the decision. This "muddling through" method of review
usually results in high judicial costs, long delay and unpredictable
results. In order to get better insight into why courts choose this
middle position, the job of the reviewing court must be investigated.
The Nature of Judicial Review
Regardless of how a reviewing court views its role in the system,
certain basic tenants are respected. First, courts realize that
administrative decisions usually involve complex scientific and technical
expertise." When an agency relies on its own expertise, particularly
in an area with which judges are not familiar, courts should give great
deference to the agency's decision.13 Second, courts should not
substitute their own views for those of an agency."' Administrators
must often make tough decisions involving allocation of scarce
resources in the pursuit of unattainable congressional goals. For this
reason, courts should be hesitant to order an agency to undertake
specific actions, even if the court believes the actions would advance
the agency's statutory mission."2 Third, courts should be most willing
to intervene in the administrative process when agencies seek to make
rules without public process, since public participation is fundamental
126. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 261 (1978).
127. Wong Yank Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
128. One commentator exclaims "the Administrative Procedure Act is positively
misleading in some particulars, and anyone relying on it for an account of the scope
of judicial review of administrative action during the decade of the 1970's would be
sorely embarrassed." Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Deci-
sion Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301 (1981).
129. Jasanoff & Nelin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
22 JURIMETRICS J. 266 (1982).
130. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas 103 S. Ct. at 2246.
131. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
132. See Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss3/4
AUTOMATIC OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS
to admin'istrative rule-making."' In general, the role of the judiciary
is to monitor informal rule-making to protect constitutional rights and
effectuate congressional intent, but not to unduly interfere."' These
general principles are the starting point for courts undertaking review
of administrative action.
Beyond these basic tenets, the Supreme Court has clarified the
judicial role in a number of recent opinions. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,"'5 marked the Supreme Court's first con-
sideration of the nature of review of administrative decision-making.
In the context of an informal decision by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation approving a highway project through a park,"3 the Court call-
ed the court's job a "plenary review.""1 7 Even though the action was
the product of an informal procedure without formal findings or pro-
duction of any sort of record, the Court held that the agency's action
was not insulated from review.38' Reviewing courts are to engage in
a "thorough, probing and in-depth review"33 to determine whether
the administrator acted within the scope of his authority,"0 whether
his decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion on
the basis of the facts before him when the decision was made,"1 and
whether he followed the necessary procedural requirements in making
his decision."'
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,"' the Supreme Court gave lower courts more advice
133. "The fulfillment of [congressional purpose] is impossible without direct
public participation through democratic administrative processes." Note, A Generic
Approach of Intervention in Administrative Proceedings-Increased Participation and
Efficiency Through Regulatory Reform, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1427 (1982). See Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (1965) (public's
interest must be actively protected by agency); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) (republished by Win. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. in
1973); L. JAFFEE, supra note 125, at 19 (public is not likely to accept power exercised
in camera); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability:
The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rule Making, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1276 (1972); Wright, supra note 117, at 379 (section 553 contemplates public dialogue).
134. See supra note 116.
135. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
136. Id. at 406.
137. Id. at 420.
138. Id. at 418.
139. Id. at 415.
140. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 162-68.
141. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
142. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417. See infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
143. 435 U.S. at 519 (1978).
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on review of administrative decision-making. In the context of the
Atomic Energy Commission's decision on the problem of nuclear waste
and the licensing of nuclear power plants," the Court limited the scope
of review of administrative decision-making by placing a flat ban on
judicial imposition of procedure above that required by the
Administrative Procedure Act."5 Noting the flexibility built into the
Administrative Procedure Act to allow agencies to discharge their
multitudinous duties,"' the Court totally banned reversal for lack of
procedure where an agency fulfilled the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act and its own enabling statutes and
rules.' 7 The Court further directed that where an agency provides
a contemporaneous explanation of its decision, reviewing courts must
look to this source and this source alone to judge whether the rule
has been adequately justified."8
The Supreme Court further clarified the job of the reviewing
court in Motor Vehicle."' In this case, the Court found the Secretary
of Transportation's attempt to rescind the automatic restraint
requirements to be arbitrary and capricious for failure to justify
adequately not choosing one of the many alternatives within the am-
bit of the existing rule."' Focusing on substantive review of ad-
144. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 522.
145. Id. at 524. "Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the
exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose
them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." Under section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, in order to promulgate a rule all an agency need do
is publish notice in the Federal Register, give anyone interested the opportunity to
submit written comments on the proposed rule, and include with the final rule a con-
cise general statement of the rule's basis and purpose. 5 U.S.C. S 553 (1977).
146. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543.
147. Id. at 546. The Court ruled that to hold any differently would result in
unpredictability, unfair second-guessing and unwarranted judicial interference. Id.
148. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549. The debate still rages over the meaning
and potential impact of Vermont Yankee. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
S 6:35-37 (1978 & 1982 Supp.); Beatson, A British View of Vermont Yankee, 55 TuL.
L. REV. 418 (1981); Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court(s) Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1833 (1978); Byse, supra note 117; Davis, Administrative
Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3; Nathanson, The
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation,
16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 183 (1979); Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmen-
tal Law Under Close Scrutiny 67 GEO. L.J. 699 (1979); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA,
the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 345; Stewart, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978);
Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55
TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981); Comment, Counter Revolution in the Federal Courts of Appeal-
The Aftermath of Vermont Yankee, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 723 (1981).
149. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2856.
150. Id. at 2871.
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ministrative decision-making, the Court directed reviewing courts to
reverse an agency decision if:
The agency relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an im-
portant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view of the product of agency expertise."'
In Motor Vehicle, the Court attempted to strike a balance between
the active judicial role advocated in Overton Park"' and the call for
restraint in Vermont Yankee"' by deciding that a rule of long-standing
deserves greater deference than a newly promulgated rule." Further-
more, the Court held that total rescission of such a rule is arbitrary
and capricious when the agency makes no contemporaneous statement
to justify foregoing clear technological alternatives within the scope
of the proposal."' Thus, judicial review of total abandonment of a deci-
sion in long-standing will differ from an Overton Park review in that
agencies must specifically explain why clear alternatives are foregone.
These Supreme Court decisions together with the Administrative
Procedure Act"" constitute what might best be referred to as the
requirement that agencies engage in "reasoned decision-making."' 5
Although courts cannot change the structure of decision-making by
requiring new procedures which would enhance judicial review under
Vermont Yankee, they must still engage in a substantial inquiry to
judge the propriety of agency actions. The review announced in
Overton Park remains the model, directing courts to inquire into three
separate areas: authority, procedural regularity, and rationality."' Each
of these areas must be addressed in light of the principle of "reasoned
decision-making."
151. Id. at 2867.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 135-42.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
154. Motor Vehicle, 103 U.S. at 2866.
155. Id. at 2871. "We hold that ...the mandatory [automatic] restraint rule
may not be abandoned without any consideration whatsoever of an airbag-only
requirement." Id.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 174-85. This note will not deal with
formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act.
157. As Judge Bazelon said, "[W]hen administrators provide a framework for
principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of judicial
review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process .. " Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
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Judicial Review of Authority
The scope of the power delegated by Congress to an
administrative agency is a matter of statutory interpretation which
rests with the judiciary.'59 Because the legislature grants authority
to agencies using broad language and agencies usually do not adopt
standards to limit their own power, 6' the judicial role is to interpret
for the administrator "what job is to be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority.''. Judges are experienced with
statutory interpretation and this review involves questions of law
which judges can feel confident deciding. 62
Review of statutory authority changes over time. On initial
review of a congressional delegation, the judiciary generally defines
the scope of the agency's discretion.'63 This interpretation is crucial
to the agency, since it will set the tone for review of authority in
subsequent cases. 6' Whenever authority is in question, courts must
judge whether an agency has "exceeded its discretion" by making a
choice outside the range which the law permits," or "abused its discre-
tion" by making a choice within the range permitted but for improper
reasons.' If a court finds that the agency has either exceeded or
abused its discretion by acting in a manner not "committed to agen-
cy discretion" by the law,67 the court must overturn the decision and
remand the case to the agency for resolution.'
159. Id. at 412.
160. Federal legislation is usually strikingly broad and unspecific because (1)
legislators often cannot specify at the outset what precise policies are to be followed,
(2) legislators lack the resources to clarify directives, (3) legislators lack the incentives
to clarify directives, (4) legislators want to avoid resolving controversial policy issues,
(5) legislators' experience in areas varies, and (6) language limits specificity. Stewart,
supra note 117, at 1677 n.26. Although the very justification of fair process is the
development of a detailed body of law promulgated by agency experts, no such law
has been fashioned or inconsistently applied, so that congressional intent has been
frustrated. See B. GOLDWATER, THE COMING BREAKPOINT (1976); B. SCHWARTZ, THE PRO-
FESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 144 (1959); Schwartz, supra note 123, at 448.
161. Bowles v. Willingham, 121 U.S. 503, 515 (1944).
162. Some commentators worry that courts often abdicate this role of statutory
interpretation. Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33 AD. L. REV.
183, 184 (1981); Stewart, supra note 117, at 1673.
163. L. JAFFE, supra note 125, at 336.
164. Id.
165. Rodgers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion", 57 TUL. L. REV. 776, 777
(1983).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Under Overton Park, a court is not free to exchange its view of the correct
results with the agency's. Instead, it must send the matter back to the agency for
further action. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413. See Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2874.
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Consider, for example, the authority of the NHTSA to
promulgate the automatic occupant restraint regulation. The NHTSA
is empowered to establish motor vehicle safety standards to reduce
death and injury from traffic accidents.""9 In the exercise of this power,
the agency may proceed using informal rule-making"' because it needs
to resolve factual controversies and expose major issues of policy."'
Congress passed the Safety Act in 1966 to force unwilling automobile
manufacturers to make their cars safer,'72 justifying the NHTSA's
creation of standards which force the automobile industry to develop
new safety technologies.' Although Congress directed the NHTSA
to create only reasonable standards in regard to feasibility, costs, and
lead time, the legislative history makes it clear that safety is to be
their most important consideration.
Judicial Review of Procedure
Judicial review of informal rule-making procedure is narrow.
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act sets forth all of the
procedural requirements an agency must follow to promulgate rules
by informal methods. 7' This law requires only that the agency publish
169. 15 U.S.C. S 1381 (1982).
170. See supra note 117.
171. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
172. Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 663.
173. "When the Safety Act was passed in 1966, the Senate committee noted
that the NHTSA must consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility, and adequacy of
lead time. The committee made it clear, however, that safety shall be the most impor-
tant consideration in the issuance of standards under the Safety Act." Marshall, The
Automobile Industry and the Department of Transportation: Striving for Practical Solu-
tions, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 81, citing S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).
174. Informal rule-making is governed by section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States;
or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or
to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law.
The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings;
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notice of its proposed rule-making in the Federal Register, allow
interested persons to submit their view by written comments,'75 and
incorporate a concise, general statement of the basis and purpose of
the rule with the substantive regulation when announced.'76 While
agencies can supplement these procedures as they see fit, courts
cannot require them to use additional procedures except in extreme
cases.
77
(2) references to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does
not apply -
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates
the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis-
sion of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general state-
ment of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to
be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections
556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made
not less than 30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemp-
tion or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found
and published with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interest person the right to petition for
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. S 353 (1977).
175. 5 U.S.C. S 553(b), (c) (1977). Although the wording of this section is less
than clear, it is clear that the agency need not give the public an opportunity to pre-
sent their claims orally in order to comply.
176. 5 U.S.C. S 553(c) (1977). Although the law clearly requires that the substan-
tive rule be published, 5 U.S.C. S 553(d) (1977), it does not specifically state that the
basis and purpose statement also be published. This is thought to be included in the
substantive rule and uniformly published with it.
177. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. In the 1970's there was a movement
in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to remand decisions where the reviewing
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Again, analogy to the automatic restraint regulation is
illustrative. Since the NHTSA's enabling statute requires no pro-
cedures above and beyond the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the agency is generally free to shape its own
procedures.'78 Prior to promulgating a rule, the NHTSA need only
publish notice of proposed rule-making in the Federal Register which
is broad enough to include all possible alternatives."9 After allowing
the public to submit written comments, the NHTSA must write a
general statement of basis and purpose in which it takes notice of
most of the comments submitted and attempts to respond to
criticisms.'O When the regulation becomes subject to judicial contest,
the NHTSA can then offer the court a voluminous document which
includes all the scientific data it has collected, all the public comments,
and its contemporaneous justification for deciding as it did.
Judicial Review of Substantive Regulation
Even if an administrative decision is a valid exercise of authority
made after proper procedure is followed, it can still be remanded if
it is irrational. Courts will reverse agency decision-making if, on the
basis of the facts before the administrator when he acted, his deci-
sion is arbitrary and capricious. 8' Courts must engage in a substan-
tial inquiry into the decision to consider whether the actual decision
was based on consideration of all the relevant factors.'82 If a court
finds that the administrator has made a clear error in judgment, or
has failed to consider obvious alternatives, the decision must be
court felt that there was insufficient procedure. Courts would order oral hearing, cross-
examination, and suggestions on improving the record for judicial review purposes.
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 426 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvestor Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See also Stewart, supra note 117, at 1805; Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.
401 (1975). Student notes have often proposed court-imposed procedure as a way to
improve the procedure. See, Note, A Specific Proposal for Hybrid Rulemaking, 7 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 69 (1980); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for
Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV. 782 (1974). Vermont Yankee moots such arguments
by its absolute ban on imposition of procedures beyond those required by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.
178. The Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires the Department of
Transportation to promulgate safety standards by procedures set forth in the
Administrative.Procedure Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1392(b) (1982).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 16-93.
180. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
181. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16.
182. Id.
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reversed.1 Although this inquiry must be careful and searching, it
must also be narrow because the court cannot substitute its own
judgments for that of the agency.'
The NHTSA's automatic restraint regulations are also subject
to judicial review. Automatic restraints have already been the sub-
ject of much litigation, and have been upheld upon substantive
review.18 Since the NHTSA has shown in the past that technology
exists which would insure increased passenger safety, the new regula-
tion requiring automatic restraints might expect to carry a presump-
tion of validity. However, rescission by default may face the same
problems as the action attempted in Motor Vehicles.
Motor Vehicle changes the nature of review when rescission of
long-standing regulation is attempted. While the standard of "reasoned
decision-making" was nominally retained," the Court called for stricter
review of the rescission of a pre-existing regulation. When reviewing
rescission of a rule which allows more than one method of compliance,
courts must distinguish "policy alternatives" from "technological alter-
natives within the ambit of the existing standard.' 's? Rescission of
each "technological alternative" must be independently justified in
order to pass judicial scrutiny.'" Prediction of what method will ac-
tually be chosen for compliance is irrelevant to this judicial require-
ment, even where the agency fails to justify rescission of alternatives
representing only one percent of predicted compliance.'"
Apart from this quantitative change in documentation, Motor
Vehicle also announced a qualitative change in judicial review. In Motor
Vehicle, the Court held that rescission of one of the alternatives for
which justification was documented was inadequately justified.1" The
183. Id. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
184. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; L. JAFFEE, supra note 125, at 182 (once an
agency shows that it considered the relevant factors, courts should not interfere).
185. See supra notes 16-93 and accompanying text.
186. The Court ruled that the safety standard must be judged under the
arbitrary and capricious standard announced in Overton Park. Motor Vehicle, 103 S.
Ct. at 2865.
187. Id. at 2871.
188. Where a "technological alternative" is abandoned without any justifica-
tion, the rescission is arbitrary and capricious. Id.
189. An agency cannot justify rescinding an otherwise worthwhile regulation
because one compliance alternative would be ineffective, although this might justify
further limiting compliance. Id. at 2869.
190. Id. at 2874. This part of the decision was dissented to by Justices Rehn-
quist, Powell, O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger. These Justices agreed with the rest
of the Court's opinion, that the NHTSA acted arbitrarily in its rescission action. Id.
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Court found that the NHTSA's justification, which was based on lack
of field testing,9' did not support rescission of the alternative but only
indicated that further testing was in order." The Court went so far
as to attack the NHTSA's reasoning by creating its own contradict-
ing arguments."" Thus, Motor Vehicle supports the proposition that
when a reviewing court judges justifications as to particular
"technological alternatives" in a rescission decision, it should use
stricter scrutiny.
Consequently, judicial review of administrative rule-making is
defined by the "reasoned decision-making" criteria. Administrative
actions are reviewed for authority, procedure, and substance. The
intensity of review depends upon the regulatory history of the issue
and the quality and quantity of documentation presented by the
agency. With this framework in mind, a model of judicial review is
proposed.
A MODEL OF JUDICIAL. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A delicate balance of power is built into the United States
Government system. Congress delegates power to administrative
agencies to implement programs which involve detailed scientific prob-
lems. Congressional delegation puts decision-making power in the
hands of experts who can use their special qualifications to regulate
effectively some areas of the private sector. "' These administrations
carry out long-term programs which promote the policies mandated
by the legislature in an atmosphere insulated from political pressure."
Congress created informal rule-making procedures to allow fair,
expeditious, and orderly promulgation of regulations.'" Congress fur-
ther provided that the exercise of administrative power be subject
to judicial review, to insure that after following notice and comment
procedures agencies make rational decisions that are within their
delegated responsibilities.'97 If agencies existed in a vacuum, this
191. Id. at 2872.
192. Id.
193. The Court said the NHTSA failed to take into account "the critical dif-
ference" between the detachable automatic belts and traditional seat belts, and that
since the new system involved no affirmative action, it was supported by an "inertia"
factor. Id. at 2872. This analysis appears nowhere in the notice of rule-making.
194. Some commentators say that administrative expertise is a "myth" for ad-
ministrators are appointed for political reasons, and most often favor private industry.
Schwartz, supra note 117, at 115.
195. Bruff, supra note 117, at 465.
196. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195, 1198.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
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congressionally-created system would always produce efficient and
effective regulations, for there would be full disclosure of all impor-
tant information to the public who could aid in decision-making through
fast and flexible procedure.198
Unfortunately, agencies do not exist in a vacuum, as the
automatic occupant restraint controversy illustrates. Rather than
exemplifying a swift and efficient process of decision-making,
regulatory controversies tend to drag out over long periods of time.1"
What is supposed to be a power to regulate insulated from political
pressure has become a contest to control policy between political
leaders. A system that was meant to be expeditious and orderly has
become slow and complex.
In this politically influenced context, review for "reasoned
decision-making" becomes meaningful. In the name of "reasoned
decision-making," courts assume that drastic change in agency policy
is unjustified on the facts and inconsistent with congressional
mandates.1w In this way, judicial review promotes stability in the
regulatory process. More intense review where administrative deci-
sions involve drastic change in prior policies protects the delicate
balance Congress originally built into the regulatory system. Review
for "reasoned decision-making" protects the particular congressional
policies agencies were created to effectuate from deregulation 0 1 at
the whim of the executive. Stricter judicial review also protects the
interests of regulated industries and the public, who rely on stability
in regulation to plan for the future. In short, more intense judicial
scrutiny of drastic changes in administrative policy is valuable because
it promotes stability. This stability will be demonstrated by review-
ing the legal basis for stricter review of drastic changes in policy,
and by investigating the application of "reasoned decision-making"
review in the context of the automatic restraint regulation. -
198. See Ogden, Analysis of Three Current Trends in Administrative Law: Reduc-
ing Administrative Delay, Expanding Public Participation, and Increasing Agency
Accountability, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 553 (1980).
199. Automatic occupant restraints were first proposed in 1969, and are still
in controversy fifteen years later. See supra text accompanying notes 28-93.
200. Congress established a presumption against changes in policy. Motor Vehicle,
103 S. Ct. at 2866.
201. "Deregulation" is a term whose meaning is often unclear. Although
"deregulation" may be used to mean any action which has the effect of limiting federal
bureaucracy, in this context it will have narrower meaning. "Deregulation" will be
used here to refer to affirmative attempts to retract existing regulations, so as to limit
government intervention into the private sector.
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The Legal Basis for More Intense Scrutiny of Drastic Change
The level of judicial scrutiny under "reasoned decision-making"
review varies with the extent that an agency's action affects previous
long-standing policy. This sliding scale concept"2 of the intensity of
judicial review is clearly grounded in legal precedent. While some
might claim that courts should not intrude in agency action to any
great extent in light of the Vermont Yankee decision, the concept of
the sliding scale was recently reaffirmed in the Motor Vehicle case.
The Court has continuously expressed a preference for long-
standing regulations.' The Court has required that courts who review
agency decision-making "determine whether the course followed by
[an agency] is consistent with its mandate from Congress.' ' 1 In order
to serve this function, an agency "must set forth clearly the grounds
on which it acted." ' As a corollary of this rule, agencies may ar-
ticulate the basis of their decisions by reference to other decisions,
for prior decisions provide a guide to action that agencies may be
expected to take in future cases.' For this reason, "[a] settled course
of behavior embodies the agency's informed judgment that, by pursu-
ing that course, it will carry out the policies committed to it by
Congress."' 7 Consequently, there is a presumption that policy is best
carried out by adherence to the settled rule. 8
Agencies can change established rules on regulations when new
circumstances make those rules unnecessary to effectuate congres-
sional intent. 9 However, courts will only accept this justification if
the grounds for departure are clearly set forth so that the reviewing
court can adequately judge the consistency of the change with the
agency's mandate. ' ° Under this rule, the review of drastic change in
policy requires more intense scrutiny.
202. "Sliding scale" will be used to refer to the proportional relationship be-
tween the intensity of review and the degree of change in policy an administrative
action represents. This analysis goes further than just proposing that drastic reversal
of policy will be more intensely reviewed. What is proposed here is that every change
in policy is reviewed more strictly than no change, and that the more drastic the
change the stricter the review.
203. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. at 806.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 807.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 808.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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This more intense scrutiny of administrative decision-making may
arguably contradict the spirit of Vermont Yankee;"' however, the rules
can be distinguished. In Vermont Yankee, the court rejected the lower
court's decision to impose additional procedures on an agency action
above and beyond those specified in the APA.212 The court said that
judicially imposed procedures would create unpredictability and lead
to administrative waste."3 More intense review of administrative
decision-making, such as is involved in the sliding scale concept, would
force agencies to use more procedure to change regulations. Under
the sliding scale concept, lower courts can impose more procedure
by an indirect method, and so can do indirectly what Vermont Yankee
directly prohibits. More intense review results in delay and forces
agencies to document extensively their decisions, at high costs to the
agencies. A sliding scale of intensity of review would contradict the
spirit of Vermont Yankee, limiting it to its facts.
These arguments are addressed in Motor Vehicles."4 Motor Vehi-
cle says that it is erroneous to interpret Vermont Yankee so broadly
as to prohibit intense judicial scrutiny."' Vermont Yankee is not "a
talisman under which any agency decision is by definition
unimpeachable." ' More intense scrutiny of administrative actions that
drastically change long-standing policy is justified because "[r]evoca-
tion [of regulation] constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views
as to the proper course." '17 The agency's settled course is presumed
to carry out the policies mandated by Congress, and requires that
the agency supply "reasoned analysis for the change."2 '
Although the Court continues to claim that the standard of
review has not changed,1 9 the intensity with which it applies to that
standard is different when a long-standing policy is at issue. On the
basis of the Motor Vehicle decision, courts should investigate ad-
ministrative action to the point where they can decide how great a
shift in policy the action represents and then pursue the correspon-
ding intensity of review.
Thus, judicial review of drastic change in administrative policy
deserves more intense judicial review. This review does not violate
211. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547.
212. Id. at 524.
213. Id. at 546.
214. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2870-71.
215. Id. at 2870.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2866.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Vermont Yankee, and is consistent with the Court's teachings in Motor
Vehicle. This more intense review is warranted by the protection built
into "reasoned decision-making" for stability in regulatory process.
The Reasons Behind Stricter Review of Drastic Change
More intense review of administrative actions that involve a
substantial change in policy is justified by the beneficial effect such
review has on the United States system of government. More intense
review of administrative change in policy promotes stability. Although
stricter review does not prohibit changes in policy, it slows down the
process to require greater disclosure of information at high cost to
the agencies. More intense review has two particularly beneficial
effects: first, it protects the congressional intent embodied in delegated
authority from deregulation by the executive, and second, it protects
the public's expectation of continuing regulation so that it can make
rational decisions about the future.
More intense judicial review of drastic policy change protects
the delicate balance of power between the branches of government.
The executive, who has great power over administrative action," can
damage the congressional intent behind delegation of power. This
occurs though executive pressure on agencies to rescind long-standing
regulations. Because an agency's actions are not directly reviewable
by Congress,"' were it not for judicial review there would be very
little protection for congressional policy making. When an agency's
proposal rule or regulation embodies a drastic shift in policy, there
is great danger that the executive is avoiding existing regulations
in order to reduce federal bureaucracy.'" This tension between
220. Under Executive Order No. 12,291, the executive branch prohibited all
major rules which could not withstand its own cost-benefit analysis. E.O. 12,291, supra
notes 75, 121.
221. Now that the legislative veto has been judged unconstitutional, Congress
cannot directly review administrative decisions. See supra note 120. But see How Con-
gress May Replace the Legislative Veto, 1983 BUSINESS WEEK 29 (July 11, 1983). They
can, however, legislatively alter an agency's "mandate" or purpose, but this is highly
unlikely.
222. In a recent case holding an attempt at deregulation arbitrary and capricious,
where the rule had existed for over forty years, the court said:
We recognize that a new administration may try to effectuate new
philosophies that have been implicitly endorsed by the democratic pro-
cess. Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that the leaders of every administra-
tion are required to adhere to the dictates of statutes that are the pro-
duct of democratic decision making. Unless officials of the executive branch
can convince Congress to change the statutes they find objectionable, their
duty is to implement the statutory mandates in a rational manner.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (NLRB; rescission of home work rule disallowed).
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congressional policy and executive policy should be limited by intense
judicial review.
It would be improper and unwise, on the other hand, to prohibit
all mechanisms of deregulation by the executive branch.' More intense
judicial review of deregulation by the executive, however, is.proper
because it insures that deregulations will be more fully considered
on the basis of the factual circumstances and the agency's congres-
sional mandate. By forcing an agency which rescinds a regulation to
disclose its reasoning in such a way that the court can understand
why the change is necessary, courts can measure the agency's action
against the congressional policy to which the agency is subject.n ' This
slows regulatory change and insures rationality. If the executive is
dissatisfied with the prospect of more intense judicial review, he can
appeal to the legislature to take action to deregulate. Thus, every
decision to rescind a standing regulation which represents long-
standing policy would be subject to careful investigation by either
Congress or a court. Any changes would be fully examined in light
of the current factual circumstances and legislative purpose.
Further, more intense review of administrative action that
drastically changes long-standing policy protects public expectations.
Regulated industry relies on long-standing policy of federal regula-
tions in business planning decisions." Often, industry must undertake
long-term research and development to conform with regulation which
it expects to be effected in the future. 6 When a regulation that is
about to go into effect is rescinded, industry bears the cost of research
and development as well as the cost of retooling its production
systems."7 Beyond the financial interest of regulated industry, the
223. A reviewing court may not set aside an agency's rule. "Merely because
the Commission has on an earlier occasion reached another result; administrative
authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obligations of due process, to
adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances. Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968).
224. An agency must examine all relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
225. See Magat, Symposium: Managing the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1981).
226. In the automatic occupant restraint controversy, for example, the
automobile industry has spent over fifteen years developing airbag technology at a
great cost. See Graham & Gorham, Commentary: NHTSA and Passive Restraints: A
Case of Arbitrary and Capricious Deregulation, 35 AD. L. REv. 193, 196 (1983).
227. There was much waste in retooling costs when the automatic occupant
restraint requirement was rescinded just months before it was to go into effect. Graham
& Gorham, supra note 226, at 202.
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general public benefits when long-standing policies are protected
because great policy shifts in regulations can adversely effect the
economy, the environment, and public health and safety. 8 Violent
change at the whim of an agency could do injury to these social
concerns.
Thus, more intense judicial review is good because it stabilizes
regulatory process. Both the balance of power within government and
the public's expectations benefit from the stability such judicial review
brings. This stability can best be shown in the context of the automatic
occupant restraint controversy.
"Reasoned Decision-Making" and the Automatic Occupant Restraint
Problem
The ongoing controversy over automatic occupant restraints is
a good context in which to consider the bounds of the concept of
"6reasoned decision-making" review. Subject to judicial scrutiny a
number of times in the past fifteen years,' the controversy over
federal requirement of automatic occupant restraints involves a
struggle between opposing branches of the federal government as well
as between opposing interests in the private sector.' Consideration
of the controversy in the context of the claim of stability offered by
the sliding scale concept of "reasoned decision-making" review is in
order.
The NHTSA had three basic options in responding to Motor
Vehicle. First, the NHTSA could have attempted to rescind totally
the automatic occupant restraint requirement. Although the NHTSA
has attempted to do this in the recent past and has failed, it did not
fail because its decision was incorrect as a matter of law. The reason
the judiciary would not allow the NHTSA to rescind its safety stan-
dard in its last rule-making was because the agency failed to docu-
ment "reasoned decision-making" on the issues involved. ' Prospec-
tively, the Supreme Court returned the matter to the NHTSA not
for a different decision on the matter but only for reconsideration
of its prior decision. 2
228. Joseph, 404 F.2d at 210.
229. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2856; Pacific Legal Foundation, 593 F.2d at
1338; Ford Motor Co., 473 F.2d at 1241; Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 659.
230. In the private sector, automobile manufacturers have traditionally opposed
the federal mandate while consumer groups and insurance companies have welcomed
it. See supra notes 11-12.
231. Motor Vehicle, 103 S. Ct. at 2896.
232. Id.
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Had the NHTSA decided to totally abandon automatic restraints,
however, their decision would have been subjected to the intense
judicial scrutiny announced in Motor Vehicles.' The agency would have
had to change its rule-making record so that clear justification for
foresaking all alternatives short of total rescission was documented.
Under this strict standard, total rescission would have been almost
impossible to justify as even the weakest automatic restraint require-
ment would result in a great increase in traffic safety.
Secondly, the NHTSA had the option of enacting weak regula-
tion. The NHTSA's compromise regulation, which is flexible in
compliance options and includes a provision for rescission upon passage
of MUL's, will be subjected to relatively intense review, but not as
strict as was the case in Motor Vehicle."' Although the new regula-
tion may result in total rescission of automatic restraint regulation,
by following this plan the NHTSA has clearly taken an affirmative
step toward increased traffic safety. In arguing for less strict judicial
scrutiny, the agency can rely on Chrysler Corp."5 to show how this
standard has already passed judicial scrutiny, and only involves
implementation of an existing rule. However, since the new legisla-
tion may result in total abandonment of long-standing federal regula-
tion, it should receive strong judicial scrutiny.
Third, the agency could have enacted a forceful regulation. Had
the NHTSA implemented a regulation requiring either airbags or
nondetachable belts, judicial scrutiny should have been the weakest.
As this action could not have been viewed as an abandonment of
automatic restraints but only as a reaffirmation of the idea accepted
long ago, review might best follow the spirit of Vermont Yankee. If
this had been the case, the agency could have argued that limiting
compliance options was not a Motor Vehicle-type of rescission but
rather the only proper way to enforce the spirit of automatic
restraints.
Through application of the sliding scale model of judicial review
in the automatic restraints controversy, the strengths and weaknesses
of the system become clear. Total abandonment of the automatic
restraint concept would likely work the most harm on regulatory
stability, and so should be subject to the strictest review. Compromise
233. See generally Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-look Doctrine, 1983 Sup.
CT. REV. 177.
234. Commentators currently disagree on this point. For a worthwhile discus-
sion of this controversy, see Edwards, Judicial Review of Deregulation, 11 N. KY. L.
REV. 229 (1984).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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regulation, which is evaluated on its merits and not its form, should
command strong but less strict scrutiny. Compromise supports stability
in government and industry while delaying radical change in long-
standing regulation. Finally, a regulatory decision implementing long-
standing ideals is subject to the weakest scrutiny and so allows ex-
pectations to be met quickly. While uncertain degrees of scrutiny may
interfere with decision-making, the benefits of the sliding scale model
clearly outweigh this fault.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the NHTSA can abandon the automatic restraints concept
so long as they advance traffic safety, regardless of their congres-
sional mandate. In refusing to adopt a strict regulation mandating
airbags or nondetachable belts, the NHTSA changes long-standing
expectations of industry and violates congressional intent. The adop-
tion of a compromise regulation was improper because the NHTSA
failed to implement technology-forcing safety standards. Yet, remedy
for this wrong does not in the courts. Judicial review of administrative
decision-making relies on the concept of "reasoned decision-making,"
so that the judicial role in decision-making is very limited. However,
the Supreme Court has implemented a grading of degree of scrutiny
designed to protect stability in federal regulation. The new regula-
tion will withstand scrutiny because, even though it is improper, it
changes policy with the least injury to regulatory stability. Thus, the
NHTSA can violate congressional will (by not implementing
technology-forcing standards) and get away with it.
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